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Abstract jurisdictional policies have created an uneasy reality in Indian
country.2 After a fourteen-year-old child was killed by a shotgun blast
within the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, the United States
Supreme Court, in Duro v. Reina,3 held that a tribal court no longer had the
jurisdiction to try and punish an accused when the accused belonged to
another tribe. Earlier, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe' eliminated tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes in Indian
communities.
As a result of the these decisions, tribes could assert criminal jurisdic-
tion only over Indians who were members of the prosecuting tribe. In di-
vesting tribes of jurisdiction over all others, Duro and Oliphant reasoned
that tribal jurisdiction was an unwarranted intrusion on personal liberty.'
Duro and Oliphant also perpetuated the ideological movement toward im-
plicit divestment of tribal sovereignty. This practice can unpredictably
redefine tribal sovereign powers because without implicit divestment, tribal
* B.A. 1985, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1992, Harvard Law School.
1. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990) (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
2. Indian country is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
3. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
5. Duro, 495 U.S. at 692; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
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powers can be understood as retained until expressly divested by Congress
through treaty or statute.6
The ideological ramifications of the Oliphant and Duro decisions created
immediate and practical law enforcement concerns. While non-Indians
could be prosecuted by states for committing crimes in Indian communities,
Indians who were not members of the prosecuting tribe could not be prose-
cuted by any court under Duro because neither the federal government nor
most states assumed jurisdiction over certain offenses in Indian country.7
Consequently, law enforcement was achieved by means of cross-deputiza-
tion agreements.8
Recently, however, Congress effectively overturned Duro by reaffirming
the "inherent" power of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over all Indians,9
both members and nonmembers. Although tribes still cannot prosecute
non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian country, the legislation has cast
doubt on Oliphant.'0 One practical reason for this doubt is that both non-
Indians and nonmember Indians can enter many Indian communities."
Because tribes cannot try non-Indians under Oliphant, tribal police and
court efforts to maintain law and order remain extraordinarily complex be-
cause enforcement is contingent on the identity of the perpetrator. More
important, because both Duro and Oliphant relied on similar reasoning,
Congress's recent abolition of Duro's jurisdictional distinction between
6. "Sovereign authority is presumed until Congress affirmatively acts to take such authority
away .... '[W]hen a question of tribal power arises, the relevant inquiry is whether any limitation
exists to prevent the tribe from acting, not whether any authority exists to permit the tribe to
act.'" Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 71-72 (2d ed. 1988)); see
also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
7. The Supreme Court, however, did not accept the theory of a jurisdictional void. Duro, 495
U.S. at 697.
8. See Katie Hickox, Crimes Committed on Reservations, States News Service, Oct. 18, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File ("In New Mexico, some pueblos have set up tempo-
rary alliances with county and state courts to fill the jurisdictional void.").
9. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646, amended the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. 1301 (1988), by further defining the "powers of self-government" to mean: "[T]he
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians."
10. A recent congressional debate highlights such doubt:
Mr. Kyl: "Is the legislation a precursor to overturning the Oliphant decision in which the
Supreme Court precluded tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians?"
Mr. Miller of California: "This legislation is in no way meant to change the criminal misde-
meanor jurisdiction of tribes over non-Indians." 137 CONG. REC. H2988, 2989 (daily ed. May 14,
1991).
11. Duro, 495 U.S. at 695; Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 466
(1976) (The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes' reservation population is only 19% of the
total reservation population.).
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member and nonmember Indians in criminal cases may call attention to
problems associated with the "implicit divestment" and "personal liberty"
theories used in Oliphant, followed in Duro, and replicated in other cases.
This Article discusses the underlying theories of Duro and Oliphant, in-
cluding notions of "internal self-governance" and "citizenship." As a pref-
ace to this discussion, the present federal criminal jurisdiction scheme and
its origins will be introduced in order to provide the context for the linger-
ing dispute advanced by Duro and Oliphant.
II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES AND CASES APPLICABLE TO
INDIAN COUNTRY
By 1790, "Trade and Intercourse" acts were regulating crime and trade
with Indians. The early acts placed the federal government in the position
of moderating criminal disputes arising between United States citizens and
noncitizen Indians.12 For example, the March 30, 1802 Trade and Inter-
course Act called for the punishment of non-Indian citizens who committed
crimes against Indians in Indian lands. Indians who committed crimes
against non-Indian citizens in a state or territory were punished after a
United States official made "application to the nation or tribe, to which
such Indian or Indians shall belong, for satisfaction."13 Geographic separa-
tion between many tribes and non-Indians, however, meant that little crime
should have been governed by the federal acts.14
In the early 1800s, Chief Justice Marshall examined the relationship be-
tween Indian tribes and the federal government. In Johnson v. M'Intosh,15
Marshall evaluated the strength of land titles originating in Indian tribes,
Europe, and the colonies under the discovery doctrine:
[D]iscovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, it was made, against all other European govern-
ments, which title might be consummated by possession.
12. E.g., Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (expired in 1793), federally directed states to
moderate crimes by citizens or U.S. inhabitants against Indians. Policy dictated that "provision
should be made for inflicting adequate penalties upon all those who, by violating [Indian] rights,
shall infringe the treaties and endanger the peace of the Union." President Washington's Third
Annual Message, (Oct. 25, 1791), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 15, 16
(Francis P. Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990).
13. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802) (repealed in 1834).
14. Separation between tribes and non-Indians was supported by law. Non-Indian settlers on
Indian land were fined up to $1000 and imprisoned for up to one year. Non-Indian citizens often
needed passports to travel in Indian land. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 141 (1802)
(repealed in 1834).
15. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the na-
tion making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from
the natives... 16
Under the discovery theory, the United States acquired English rights, 7
and lands "unknown to all Christian people"'" could be discovered by
Christian nations. "Heathens" would maintain the occupancy title, while
Europeans would take the discovery title to grant lands. 9
Marshall elaborated on the federal and Indian tribe relations in Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia.2° The Cherokee Nation sought to enjoin the State of
Georgia from regulating within Cherokee lands. The Court held that the
tribe erred in petitioning the Court as a foreign nation2 because the Court
considered tribes "domestic dependent nations."22
Marshall clarified the Court's vision of the federal/tribal power struc-
ture in Worcester v. Georgia,23 holding that the states could not interfere
with the relations between the Indian tribes and the federal government.24
Discovery, as applied in Worcester, was largely the exclusive right of one
European nation to purchase lands from the tribes.25
Worcester defined tribal power as independence-constrained by federal
trade management, treaty, and discovery doctrine restrictions on a tribe's
land sales or foreign relations. 26 Discovery constraints bound European na-
tions more than tribes.27 Tribes retained "their title to self-government." 21
16. Id. at 573.
17. Id. at 584, 588.
18. Id. at 576.
19. Id. at 574. M'Intosh determined that discovery could possibly give the discoverer an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy. Id. at 585-87. The discoverer could
extinguish Indian occupancy and acquire Indian land. Id. at 588-89. "Conquest gives a title
which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny .... The conqueror prescribes its limits." Id.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
21. Id. at 19. The constitutional language of Article I, § 8 gives Congress the power to regu-
late "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. According to Marshall, if Indian tribes were in fact foreign nations, the
Constitution would not have distinguished the two. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19.
22. Id. at 17. According to Marshall, Indians have an "unquestioned right to the lands they
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; ... They
may... be denominated domestic dependent nations.... [T]hey are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id.
23. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
24. Id. at 561-62.
25. Id. at 544, 559.
26. Id. at 557-61.
27. Id. at 544, 559. "To avoid bloody conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it
was necessary for the nations of Europe to establish some principle which all would acknowledge,
and which should decide their respective rights as between themselves." Id. at 543.
28. Id. at 560.
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Although Marshall believed that tribes had governments, "Courts of Indian
Offenses" were established in 1883 on the premise that reservations were
lawless.29
The Act of March 3, 1817,30 the forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 1152, 3 1 ex-
tended federal laws into Indian country32 but did not apply to offenses com-
mitted by one Indian against another Indian.33  Crimes between non-
Indians in Indian country had been included within federal jurisdiction, but
eventually courts determined that federal jurisdiction over non-Indians
would be transferred to the states.34
In Ex parte Crow Dog, 35 the Supreme Court confirmed that federal
courts had no jurisdiction over crimes between Indians. Tribes had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over these crimes in Indian country until the Major Crimes
Act of 1885.36 The Act, in effect today, places certain enumerated offenses
involving Indians within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.37  Tribal
29. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs established tribunals at all Indian agencies "except
among the civilized Indians, consisting of three Indians, to be known as the court of Indian of-
fenses," because "[m]any of the agencies are without law of any kind, and the necessity for some
rule of government on the reservations grows more and more apparent each day." H.R. ExEC.
Doc. No. 1, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1883), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 12, at 160. The courts still operate in Indian country that lack tradi-
tional or tribal courts. See Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1993).
30. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988). The statute provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as
to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian coun-
try.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian coun-
try who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively.
Iti
32. Areas under the jurisdiction of the United States include military bases, vessels on the
high seas, and Indian country. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 n.9 (1977).
33. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383.
34. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 648 n.9; United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
35. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
36. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
37. The Major Crimes Act subjects an Indian who commits murder, rape, or any of the other
offenses listed in the act "to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
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courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over major offenses and exclusive
jurisdiction over minor offenses between Indians.3"
During the half-century preceding the passage of the 1885 Major
Crimes Act, many tribes were removed from land east of the Mississippi
River to territory west of the river.39 In accordance with an assimilation
policy, Congress replaced removal with the 1887 Indian General Allotment
Act.4° The Act authorized the allotment of land to individual Indians or
families.41 Allotment curtailed a tribe's land ownership authority and dis-
empowered tribal governments.42 Eventually, the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 ended allotment and permitted restoration or expansion of tri-
bal land ownership.43 Indian tribes could reaffirm the "right to organize for
[their] common welfare, and ...adopt an appropriate constitution and
bylaws."'
38. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.21 (1978) ("We do not consider here the more
disputed question whether s. 1153 also was intended to pre-empt tribal jurisdiction."); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) ("We have no reason to decide today
whether jurisdiction under the Mijor Crimes Act is exclusive."); see also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 n.22 (1978).
39. According to President Jackson, it was:
[A]n established fact that [Indians] can not live in contact with a civilized community and
prosper.
The pledge of the United States has been given by Congress that the country destined for
the residence of this people shall be forever "secured and guaranteed to them." A country
west of Missouri and Arkansas has been assigned to them, into which the white settlements
are not to be pushed. No political communities can be formed in that extensive region,
except those which are established by the Indians themselves or by the United States for
them and with their concurrence.
President Jackson on Indian Removal, December 7, 1835, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 12, at 71-72; see Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830)
(Indian Removal Act).
40. Indian General Allotment Act (Dawes), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).
41. Citizenship was provided to qualifying Indians. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119,
§ 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). Like many acts
governing tribes, allotment was not uniformly applied to all tribes. At least nine tribes were
originally excluded from the Act. § 8, 24 Stat. at 391.
42. Under the Curtis Act, payments from the federal government were no longer made to
tribal governments, but directly to individuals. Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898). The Act
stipulated that the laws of Indian tribes "shall not be enforced at law or in equity by the courts of
the United States in the Indian Territory." § 26, 30 Stat. at 504. Tribal courts were abolished.
§ 28, 30 Stat. at 504-05.
43. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 476 (1988)).
44. § 16, 48 Stat. at 987. Tribes could vote to reject or approve the application of the Act.
§ 18, 48 Stat. at 988. Oklahoma tribes were excluded from the Indian Reorganization Act's bene-
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All Indians born in the United States became citizens in 1924, 4" and in
1953, Public Law 280 was enacted." In this Act, Congress delegated to a
few states the power to adjudicate Indian country criminal offenses.47 The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 196848 changed Public Law 280 by requiring
tribal consent to state jurisdiction. The Act was passed just before the pres-
ent era of self-governance began.49
III. SUMMARY OF DURO v. REINA AND OLIPHANT V SUQUAMISH
INDIAN TRIBE: DIVESTMENT OF EXCLUSIVE AND
CONCURRENT TRIBAL JURISDICTION
The foregoing acts and cases predominantly dealt with federal jurisdic-
tion. The concurrent or exclusive criminal jurisdiction of tribes was not
clearly addressed by courts until Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe5" and
Duro v. Reina.51 The case summaries in this section highlight the similari-
ties between Duro and Oliphant.
A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
In Oliphant, non-Indians objected to tribal jurisdiction over their
charged offenses, which included assaulting a tribal police officer. In deliv-
ering the opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that tribes claiming criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians asserted jurisdiction based on the retained
sovereignty of the tribe, not on congressional delegations or treaty
52provisions.
fits until the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act was passed. Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, ch. 831,
§§ 3, 7, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C §§ 501-504 (1988)).
45. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed 1952).
46. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988)).
47. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), states have jurisdiction in at least some of the Indian
country within the borders of some designated states, including Alaska, California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
49. See the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203, 2203-14 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988)), where Congress
found that "prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard rather
than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of the full
opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government." § 2(a)(1),
88 Stat. at 2203. Congress's Indian self-determination policy encouraged "transition from Federal
domination of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by
the Indian people." § 3(b), 88 Stat. at 2204.
50. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
51. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
52. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.
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Rehnquist divided his evaluation of the retained sovereignty of the tribe
into three parts. The first two sections of the decision were largely histori-
cal. The last section examined implicit divestment of tribal power.
Rehnquist began his historical discussion by stating that the tribal exer-
cise of jurisdiction over non-Indians was relatively new and that few tribes
had maintained formal court systems until the middle of the century. 3
Rehnquist found that treaties generally did not provide for tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians,54 and that cases discussing the matter were rare and
did not support jurisdiction.5 Rehnquist added that Congress never specif-
ically addressed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, with the exception of
the Western Territories Bill of 1834.56 This Bill was never passed but
seemed to show Congress's intent to reserve criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians to the federal government.5 7  Congress never expressly forbade
tribes from imposing criminal penalties on non-Indians,58 but Rehnquist
made explicit the unspoken assumption he felt was held by Congress-that
53. Id. at 196-97.
54. Id. at 196-99. The first federal/tribal treaty was made with the Delawares in 1778 and
provided that:
neither party to the treaty could "proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of
the other, otherwise than by securing the offender or offenders.., till a fair and impartial
trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs
and usages of the contracting parties and natural justice."
Id. at 199 n.8 (quoting the Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, U.S.-Delawares, art. IV, 7
Stat. 13, 14). According to Oliphant, only that first treaty expressly provided for such jurisdiction.
Id. Shortly after Oliphant, United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), reaffirmed that treaties
are considered grants of power from tribes, not grants to tribes. Id. at 327 n.24. Since treaties
represent grants of power from tribes, failure of tribes to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
government meant that tribes retained the jurisdiction.
55. Rehnquist also relied on a withdrawn opinion from the Solicitor of the Interior. Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 200-01 & n.1l.
56. Id. at 201-02.
57. Id. According to Oliphant, the Western Territories Bill resembled early treaties. The Bill
"did not extend the protection of the United States to non-Indians who settled without govern-
ment business in Indian territory." Id. at 202 n.13 (citing H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1834)). Congress's "unspoken assumption" that tribes were divested of criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians was evident to Rehnquist in other 19th-century congressional actions. For
example, Rehnquist reasoned that major crimes jurisdiction over Indians may be exclusively held
by the federal government. Accordingly, if tribes had jurisdiction over these crimes, tribes would
have more jurisdiction over non-Indians than they had over Indians. Id. at 203. Rehnquist's
analysis ignores the well-known contention that major crime jurisdiction may be held concur-
rently by the tribes and the federal government. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
58. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
INDIAN JURISDICTION POLICIES
tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Rehnquist be-
lieved that the executive branch shared Congress's presumption.5 9
The second part of Oliphant was a historical treaty argument. The Su-
quamish treaty "appear[ed] to be silent as to tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians,"'  but the historical context of the treaty made tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians doubtful. In the treaty's ninth article, the
tribe acknowledged its dependence on the United States. Rehnquist
thought that the acknowledgement of dependence and the promise to "be
friendly with all citizens" probably meant that the Suquamish recognized
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.61
The third and final part of the decision, which was followed closely by
Duro, discussed tribal power in terms of implicit divestment. Rehnquist
explained that tribal powers are not only expressly divested by act or treaty,
but also by implication. Tribes were deemed to have lost those powers in-
consistent with their dependent status at the tribes' incorporation into the
United States. At incorporation, tribes came into the territorial sover-
eignty of the United States, and "their exercise of separate power is con-
strained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding
sovereignty.", 62
Federal interests overrode tribal interests in protecting their territory.
Formation of the Union and adoption of the Bill of Rights indicated that
"citizens [should] be protected by the United States from unwarranted in-
trusions on their personal liberty."63 Thus, "[b]y submitting to the overrid-
ing sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
[gave] up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except
in a manner acceptable to Congress. '
B. Duro v. Reina
Duro v. Reina 65 relied heavily on Oliphant to divest tribes of inherent
sovereign powers over nonmember Indians in criminal cases. The dispute
began after the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Tribe refused to drop the charge
59. Id. at 206. Rehnquist added that a 1960 Senate report concluded that a federal trespass
law was necessary for Indian land because non-Indians were not subject to tribal jurisdiction. Id.
at 204-06 (citing S. REP. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1960)).
60. Id. at 206 (discussing the Treaty at Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (1855)).
61. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206-07 & n.16.
62. Id. at 209.
63. Id. at 210.
64. Id.
65. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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of illegal firing of a weapon against Albert Duro, a nonmember Indian.66
Duro filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court challenging
tribal jurisdiction over crimes involving an accused nonmember Indian.67
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found tribal jurisdiction.6 The
Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, eliminated congressional del-
egation or treaty provision as the source of tribal jurisdiction. As in Oli-
phant, the question was whether the tribe's retained sovereignty
encompassed such power.69 Kennedy utilized Oliphant and United States v.
Wheeler7" and cautioned that Wheeler implicitly divested tribes of power in
areas involving relations between a tribe and outsiders. External power
over outsiders "would have been inconsistent with the Tribe's dependent
status, and could only have come to the Tribe by delegation from
Congress."71
The civil power of tribes over both nonmember Indians and non-Indians
is permissible in areas that are vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity
and self-determination. Such "civil authority typically involves situations
arising from property ownership within the reservation or 'consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members.' "72
In contrast, Kennedy argued, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction "in-
volves a far more direct intrusion on personal liberties."7 As a nonmember
Indian, Duro was not able to become.a member, vote, hold office, or serve
on a jury.74 As a result, Duro's relations with the tribe were regarded as the
same as the non-Indian's in Oliphant.7 Accordingly, the "Tribe's powers
over him [were] subject to the same limitations."76
66. Id. at 681. A federal indictment charging Duro with murder and aiding and abetting
murder was dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 679-80.
67. Duro is an enrolled member of the Torres Martinez Band of Mission Indians. The victim
was an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian Tribe. Id. at 679.
68. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit based tribal jurisdiction on Duro's significant
contacts with the prosecuting community and the need for effective law enforcement. Id. at 683.
69. Id. at 684.
70. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Wheeler held that because the sources of power derive from differ-
ent sovereigns, successive tribal and federal prosecutions do not place a defendant in double jeop-
ardy. Id.
71. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
72. Id. at 688 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194).
75. Id.
76. Id. Kennedy argued that the lack of "formal" Indian court systems resulted in little
historical evidence or challenges to tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Most parties sim-
ply agreed to submit to tribal courts. Id. at 688-89.
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Though the federal government has historically treated Indians as a sin-
gle large class in many congressional acts, "the history offederal provisions
does not sustain [a] claim of tribal power."" The "statutes reflect at most
the tendency of past Indian policy to treat Indians as an undifferentiated
class."" Admitting that the evidence is unclear, Kennedy believed that tri-
bal jurisdiction applied to tribal members only.79
Kennedy also sought to protect the rights of everyone who entered In-
dian country without consenting to tribal governance. Indians, as citizens,
must "be protected ... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal lib-
erty."80 He added, "Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intru-
sion on personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the over-
riding sovereignty of the United States.""1 As such, the Court could not
submit groups of citizens, such as nonmember Indians, "for trial by polit-
ical bodies that [did] not include them."82 However, retained tribal juris-
diction over tribal members was permissible because of "the voluntary
character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation
in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent. ' 83
Kennedy found that the tribal courts posed a hazard to individual lib-
erty for several reasons. First, tribal courts are influenced by the "unique
customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are
often 'subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments,' and their
legal methods may depend on 'unspoken practices and norms.' "84 Addi-
tionally, the lack of protection afforded by the Bill of Rights and the differ-
ent protection of the Indian Civil Rights Act can result in deprivations,
including the lack of appointed counsel for indigent people. "Our cases
77. Id at 690.
78. Id.
79. The Court cited a Department of Interior opinion indicating that only adoption of non-
members into the tribe or a receipt of delegated authority would result in tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers. Id. at 692 (citing I Op. Sol. 849 (Aug. 26, 1938)). Another opinion stated that the
only remedy for "interloping nonmember Indians" was removal from the reservation or accept-
ance of delegated authority. Id. (citing 1 Op. Sol. 872 (Feb. 17, 1939)). The Court found that
these opinions provided "the most specific historical evidence ol the question before us and, we
think, support our conclusion." Id.
80. Id. at 692 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
81. Id. at 693.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 694. The Court rejected jurisdiction based on implied consent and minimum con-
tacts because they applied to both non-Indians and nonmember Indians. The Court added that
interests in effective law enforcement provided no basis for tribal jurisdiction in either Oliphant or
Duro. Id. at 695-96.




suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to subject
American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not
provide constitutional protections as a matter of right." 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF IMPLIED DIVESTMENT OF POWER INCONSISTENT
WITH DEPENDENT STATUS
Oliphant and Duro weakened the power of tribal courts and reduced
faith in their competence.8 6 Although the persuasive power of Oliphant has
created a legacy of cases that questions the validity of tribal justice, the
reasons for the legacy are unclear. The decision was predominantly a his-
torical discussion in search of some express treaty or act to divest tribes of
their retained sovereignty over non-Indians. "Commentators have sharply
criticized the Court's use of historical authority in Oliphant to support its
first two arguments."87 However, Oliphant's third, nonhistorical, implicit
divestment idea is cited with frequency. Implicit divestment curbs tribal
powers by more than just express treaty and express statute divestment. In
other words, "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status. "88
Duro relied heavily on Oliphant's implicit divestment doctrine. In cases
of implicit divestment, Oliphant and Duro recommend that Congress dele-
gate power to tribes.89 Congress could have accepted the Court's advice in
Duro and delegated the jurisdiction to tribes. Rather than support implicit
divestment by delegating jurisdiction, it is significant that Congress chose to
affirm inherent tribal power. Congress's plenary powers over Indian af-
85. Id. To resolve enforcement problems, Kennedy suggested that tribes restrain and eject
undesirable persons from tribal land and transport offenders to proper authorities in cases where
jurisdiction rested outside the tribe. Id. at 696-97. Though some states do not have the authority
to govern Indian country crimes, and though federal authority may be lacking over minor crimes
under 18 U.S.C. § 1152, the Court did not endorse the theory of a jurisdictional void. Duro, 495
U.S. at 697-98.
86. Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030, 1044 (Ariz. 1991) (en bane).
87. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Richard B. Collins, Im-
plied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479, 490-99 (1979)),
rev'd, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also T. Christopher Kelly, Note, Indians--Jurisdiction-Tribal
Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Offenders, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 537, 540-51.
88. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added).
89. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686, 698 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 210-12 (1978). After the Curtis Act suppressed the governmental power of tribes, the
Indian Reorganization Act professed the "right to organize." 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988). Reinstate-
ment of the inherent power of tribes may put to rest Duro's innuendo that powers described by the
Indian Reorganization Act simulate federally delegated powers. "Indian tribes already had such
power under 'existing law.'" Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 327-28.
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fairs9' and Congress's use of tribal "inherent" power rather than federally
delegated power may deflate the implicit divestment legacy spread by Oli-
phant because Oliphant and Duro are remarkably similar.
Resemblances between the two cases begin with the notion of depen-
dence. 9' Oliphant surmised that the Suquamish treaty's acknowledgement
of dependence probably meant that the United States exclusively would
arrest and try non-Indians. 9 Duro noted that dependent status caused im-
plicit divestment of tribal power over nonmember Indians.93 In contrast to
Duro and Oliphant, dependence could be interpreted in Worcester as tribal
allegiance with one nation. A foreign nation would secure a tribe's alle-
giance, or dependence, through treaties that would prevent the tribe from
forming alliances with other foreign nations. A tribe's allegiance was ac-
quired in exchange for some form of payment. However, tribes retained
their governmental independence.
94
[S]o long as their actual independence was untouched, and their
right to self-government acknowledged, they were willing to profess
dependence on the power which furnished supplies of which they
were in absolute need, and restrained dangerous intruders from en-
tering their country; and this was probably the sense in which the
term was understood by them.95
90. Congress's authority over Indian affairs is plenary. See COHEN, supra note 84, at 217.
Implicit divestment is weakened by Congress's nondelegation approach in Duro because the no-
tion of implicit divestment is court-created and therefore secondary to Congress's plenary legisla-
tive authority. This reading of the new act assumes that Congress's nondelegation approach
reflects Congress's disagreement with the Court's use of implicit divestment in Duro.
91. Kelly, supra note 87, at 542-43.
92. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206-08.
93. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
94. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-61 (1832). United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 323 (1978), restated Oliphant's version of incorporation and dependence in terms of
protection: "Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of
its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previ-
ously exercised." Id. at 323. In contrast, Marshall wrote that treaties stipulated that tribes would
be protected, meaning that tribes would only associate with one nation. In return, the protector
would restrain invaders. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-56. Protection "involved, practically,
no claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons." Id. at 552. Specifically protection:
[Merely bound the nation to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protec-
tion of a powerful friend and neighbor, and receiving the advantages of that protection,
without involving a surrender of their national character.
The same stipulation entered into with the United States, is undoubtedly to be con-
strued in the same manner.... Protection does not imply the destruction of the protected.
Id.
95. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547. Treaties such as the 1791 Cherokee Treaty of Holston
announced friendship and dependence on the United States for protection from "lawless and inju-
rious intrusions into their country.... This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving
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Oliphant's alternative definition is in tune with the trend to generalize the
term "dependence," but conflicts with the principle requiring doubtful stat-
utory or treaty language to be construed in favor of tribes.9 6 A favorable
interpretation could find that tribes retained jurisdiction that was concur-
rent with any federal jurisdiction.97
In addition to showing the versatile connotations of the dependency in-
gredient of implicit divestment, Duro and Oliphant are examples of the one-
sided application of the implicit divestment doctrine. Specifically, while
tribes' authority can be implicitly divested by federal courts, federal courts
generally do not imply changes in Congress's plenary power over tribes.
Occasionally, federal courts imply an extension of express congressional au-
thority over tribes when the matter is closely related to a federal statute,
such as the inclusion of lesser-included offenses in Major Crimes Act
cases.9 8 Normally, however, extensions by implication are avoided. Rela-
tions between Indians are controlled by customs and laws of the tribe unless
"Congress expressly or clearly directs otherwise." 99 Absent express provi-
sions, tribes are not subject to statutes unless congressional intent indicates
otherwise."° Indian tribes also remain subject to congressional directives
until the acts are expressly repealed.1°  Thus, in federal courts, congres-
sional power over tribes is fixed more or less expressly, whereas tribal power
is not so predictable because implicit divestment allows federal courts to
liberally diverge from treaties or acts.
the protection of one more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character,
and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." Id. at 555.
96. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973). Though dependency definitions have differed, see, e.g.,
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 291 (1909), Worcester's definition emanates from charter
and treaty interpretations. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-47, 555.
97. See Kelly, supra note 87, at 545, 548-51.
98. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973), held that Indians prosecuted in federal
court under the Major Crimes Act were entitled to jury instructions on lesser-included offenses
not enumerated in the Act because persons covered by the Act are to be tried in the "same man-
ner, as are all other persons." Keeble, 412 U.S. at 211-12 (quoting Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch.
341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988))). The Court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to deprive Indian defendants of procedural rights guaran-
teed other defendants or to make it easier to convict Indians. Id. at 212.
99. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916) (emphasis added); see also Keeble, 412
U.S. at 209 (The Major Crimes Act is "a carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the
otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for crimes committed on
Indian land.").
100. For example, adultery between Indians was not an offense expressly included within
federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court did not apply the federal law to tribes. "To justify a
court in holding that these laws are to be applied to Indians, there should be some clear provision
to that effect." Quiver, 241 U.S. at 606.
101. Id.; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546-48 (1974).
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Additionally, Duro's and Oliphant's implicit divestment doctrine in-
volves the notion of incorporation, insofar as tribes are deemed to be implic-
itly divested of authority, by virtue of their dependent status, at their
incorporation into the United States. This incorporation ingredient of the
implicit divestment doctrine harkens back to the doctrine of discovery.
The discovery reference occurred by means of Oliphant's citation to
Johnson v. M'Intosh.102 According to Oliphant, M'Intosh viewed incorpora-
tion as foreclosing the tribal ability to freely alienate land or to act as in-
dependent nations.103 M'Intosh referred to the discovery doctrine and
emphasized discovery's potentially unbridled power over tribes"°4 and the
difficulty of incorporating tribes. 105 However, Worcester v. Georgia "6 sub-
sequently limited the enormous divestment potential of the discovery doc-
trine, and in contrast to Oliphant's expansive incorporation choice,
Worcester chose to promote and shield tribal self-government.10 7 Oliphant's
use of M'Intosh is an ironic reminder that today's tribal governments have
lost more power during the modem day policy of self-governance than the
tribes lost under the doctrine of discovery.108
In addition to the discovery allusion, the notion of incorporation im-
poses uniformity. Oliphant and Duro divested tribes in 1978 and 1990, re-
spectively, even though tribes signed variant treaties at different times and
even though tribes can be subject to different legislation. Thus, application
of implicit divestment at incorporation tends to lump all tribes together
without regard for the varying treatment of different tribes at different
times, thereby contradicting Duro's concern that tribal members not be
treated as "homogenous persons among whom any Indian would feel at
home."' 0 9
The implicit divestment doctrine is unclear as to when implied losses
occur, despite Duro's and Oliphant's insistence that divestment occurred at
the incorporation of the tribes into the United States. Implicit divestment
can counterfactually declare tribal powers to be lost at some point in the
past, such that decades or centuries of incorporation into the United States
102. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (citing Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)).
103. Id. at 209.
104. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 586-90.
105. Id. at 589-91.
106. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
107. Id.
108. See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FoUND.
REs. J. 1 (discussing discovery, incorporation, and other doctrines used in Indian law).
109. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990).
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pass before tribes are known to be divested of jurisdiction over non-Indians
and nonmember Indians.
Difficulties in pinning the application date of divestment to a time of
incorporation demonstrates that implicit divestment is a difficult doctrine to
apply. Tribes could not reasonably be expected to infer the losses of juris-
diction expressed in Oliphant and Duro because congressional statements do
not show that tribal jurisdiction was clearly lost. In 1834, a House report
stated that federal jurisdiction over tribes or non-Indians was not necessar-
ily permanent or exclusive:
By the act of 3d March, 1817, the criminal laws of the United States
were extended to all persons in the Indian country, without excep-
tion, and by that act, as well as that of 30th March, 1802, they might
be tried wherever apprehended. It will be seen that we cannot, con-
sistently with the provisions of some of our treaties, and of the terri-
torial act, extend our criminal laws to offences committed by or
against Indians, of which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction; and
it is rather of courtesy than of right that we undertake to punish
crimes committed in that territory by and against our own [non-
Indian] citizens. And this provision is retained principally on the
ground that it may be unsafe to trust to Indian law in the early
stages of their Government. It is not perceived that we can with any
justice or propriety extend our laws to offences committed by Indi-
ans against Indians, at any place within their own limits.11°
This congressional statement illustrates the possibility of retained sover-
eignty, particularly when sovereignty is examined from the perspective of
express divestment. Under an exclusively express divestment rationale, the
lack of a divesting statute can reserve to a tribe jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans when a tribe's treaty did not expressly divest concurrent tribal jurisdic-
tion. "' In conjunction with historical factors supporting inherent and
retained tribal power, historical evidence supporting the retention of greater
tribal jurisdiction can be found by examining the United States custom of
establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction. 1 2 For the most part, tribes and
110. H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834), reprinted in COHEN, supra note 84,
at 116-17.
111. See supra notes 54, 97 and accompanying text.
112. Cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). In the 19th century, pursuant to Rev. Stat.
§§ 4083-4130 (1878), American consuls tried "American citizens charged with committing crimes
in Japan and certain other 'non-Christian' countries." Reid, 354 U.S. at 10. Such jurisdiction was
a grant of power from the foreign nation to the United States pursuant to treaty. Absent treaty
provisions, U.S. citizens were subject to the plenary jurisdiction of the foreign nation where an
offense occurred. Id. at 15 n.29. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion noted that the practice
of seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens pursuant to treaty was believed to be necessary
in light of the view that some countries' systems of justice were considered so inferior that justice
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the federal government forbade public, non-Indian settlements in Indian
country until allotment 13 but permitted some non-Indians to enter Indian
country. Federal jurisdiction over these few non-Indians was assumed
under treaties or acts in which the federal government had citizen jurisdic-
tion but generally not Indian jurisdiction unless it was to cover disputes
between citizens and non-citizen Indians. 
14
The federal government's extraterritorial jurisdiction practices in Indian
country corresponded to similar arrangements overseas, where federal juris-
diction over U.S. citizens in certain non-Christian countries represented a
grant of power from the foreign sovereign to the United States that did not
divest the inherent sovereignty of the host country." 5 This analogy be-
tween federal Indian law and federal extraterritorial jurisdiction is drawn
mainly to show the recurrence and convergence of the principles and to
show that if this principle were applied to tribes, greater powers of tribal
governments would be retained rather than impliedly divested because con-
current tribal authority over non-Indians had not been expressly divested
even after allotment. 
16
Nevertheless, the effect of Oliphant has been to extend implicit divest-
ment. Montana v. United States117 weakened tribal authority by extending
Oliphant, which involved criminal jurisdiction, to the civil context. As a
result, tribal civil control over non-Indians in Indian country is generally
determined by contractual-type relations or the protection of tribal
integrity.
Specifically, Montana held that tribes generally may not regulate non-
member hunting and fishing on nonmember fee land within Indian country.
could not be obtained by citizens within the foreign court system, especially with respect to Far
Eastern and Moslem nations. Id. at 55-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Generally, United States criminal jurisdiction is based on territorial principles, and criminal
statutes are not given an extraterritorial effect. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-57
(1933). Nevertheless, absent a treaty provision, United States admiralty jurisdiction extends to
crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns. Id. A ship flying a U.S.
flag is part of the U.S. territory. Id. However, in the port of another sovereign, U.S. jurisdiction
is not exclusive. The crew is answerable to the laws of the place. Id. at 150, 157-59. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), noted that the extraterritorial power of every legislature is
limited to its own subjects. Id. at 542. This might explain the practice of asserting federal or state
jurisdiction over crimes involving non-Indians and the general exclusion of federal or state juris-
diction over Indian-against-Indian crimes in Indian territory. See supra notes 12-14, 30, 31.
Under an extraterritorial paradigm, federal or state jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian coun-
try would not be exclusive.
113. See, eg., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 558 (1981).
114. See, eg., Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 143 (1802); see also supra note 112.
115. Reid, 354 U.S. at 15 n.29.
116. Cf Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
117. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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First, Montana noted that while treaty provisions guaranteeing exclusive
use of lands to the tribe would have permitted tribes to regulate nonmem-
bers, allotment diminished tribal power over lands held in fee by nonmem-
bers. "s Second, the inherent sovereignty of tribes would not support tribal
regulation of nonmembers because that power was implicitly divested. The
Court reasoned that "[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal au-
thority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."' 19 However, Mon-
tana added that tribes may regulate non-Indians who enter into consensual
relations with the tribe through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or
other relationships.12 "A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reser-
vation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."''
Consequently, Montana changed the presumption of retention of tribal sov-
ereign power to a presumption of implicit loss of tribal civil power over
non-Indians in Indian country.
In summary, the implicit divestment doctrine and its characterizations
of dependence and incorporation fail to delineate for courts or tribes the
bounds of tribal power' 22 and fail, for example, to recognize that non-In-
dian crime or civil conduct nearly always has "some direct effect" on
tribes.' 23 Duro's reliance on Oliphant and Congress's subsequent eradica-
tion of Duro should signal the close of an unworkable doctrine. The em-
ployment of the implicit divestment doctrine should also be discussed in
terms of self-government, the intended "finished product" of divestment.
118. Id. at 558-59.
119. Id. at 565.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 566.
122. Both the express and implied divestment methods begin with the presumption that tribes
retain inherent powers. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). If retained sovereignty was to be divested by express method only, the
result would coincide with an analogous view of state power presented in The Federalist Papers:
[T]he states will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively delegated
to the federal head ... [a]nd under this impression I shall lay it down as a rule, that the
State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in
one of the enumerated modes.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 at 417-18 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).




In Worcester v. Georgia,'24 Chief Justice Marshall evaluated Article 9 of
the Cherokee Treaty. The Article reads as follows:
[F]or the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention
of injuries or oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the
United States, in congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclu-
sive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all
their affairs, as they think proper. 1
25
Marshall believed that construing the "expression 'managing all their af-
fairs,' into a surrender of self-government, would be... a perversion of
their necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction which has
been uniformly put on them"'126 because such a surrender could not be for
their "benefit and comfort" or for "the prevention of injuries and oppres-
sion."' 27 An interpretation calling for the surrender of self-government on
subjects not connected with trade would "convert a treaty of peace covertly
into an act annihilating the political existence of one of the parties. Had
such a result been intended, it would have been openly avowed."' 21 In-
stead, the term "management of affairs" meant trade relations. 29 "[T]he
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not sur-
render its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection."' 130
This self-government description was written during the 1830s removal
era. The transition from removal and allotment policies to the present era
124. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
125. Id. at 553 (citation omitted). On self-government, see id. at 547-49, 553, 556-57, 560-61;
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-85 (1896).
Descriptions of tribal power varied. For example, tribes were not "possessed of the full attrib-
utes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits
they resided." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). But see United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846):
The native tribes who were found on this continent at the time of its discovery have never
been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European governments, nor
regarded as the owners of the territories they respectively occupied. On the contrary, the
whole continent was divided and parcelled out, and granted by the governments of Europe
as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and
treated as, subject to their dominion and control.
Id. at 572.
126. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553-54.
127. Id. at 554.
128. Id. "It is equally inconceivable that they could have supposed themselves ... to have
divested themselves of the right of self-government on subjects not connected with trade." Id.
129. Id. at 553-54, 556.
130. Id. at 560-61.
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of self-government policy has been marked by attempts to redefine self-gov-
emnment.1 31 Oliphant's and Duro's use of implicit divestment represents one
attempt to determine the limits of tribal self-government in a modem
context.
Before Oliphant, some tribes asserted jurisdiction over all persons dis-
turbing the community. Tribes that claimed criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians governed an entire territory and the people within the territory,
regardless of tribal or non-Indian citizenship. Oliphant's historical and im-
plied divestment arguments redefined self-government in a manner that re-
stricts tribal powers in an unnecessarily ambiguous and complex way and
ignores that internal self-governance involves tribal power over significant
tribal interests. Specifically, Oliphant limited tribal powers in terms of terri-
tory and citizenship. United States v. Wheeler 1 32 illustrates Oliphant's mod-
em self-government definition:
[L]imitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent
with their freedom independently to determine their external rela-
tions. But the powers of self-government, including the power to
prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type.
They involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus,
they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a
tribe's dependent status.133
Because of the emphasis on territory and the division of authority
largely along member or citizenship lines, these types of restrictions on
tribes resemble the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and
other extraterritorial-like provisions that outlined federal jurisdiction in In-
dian country. But, tribal power need not resemble the federal system. A
"review of the history of federal provisions does not sustain [a] claim of
tribal power." 134
A. Territory
From the perspective of territory, the Oliphant decision led Duro to con-
clude that tribes no longer retained the "basic attribute of full territorial
131. The other "selves" used in Indian law include self-determination, from the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), and self-
sufficiency, encouraged by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)). The Court's choice of self-government
in Oliphant and Duro is predictable through precedent, yet still intriguing, because its use simulta-
neously validates and invalidates Worcester.
132. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
133. Id. at 326.
134. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 690 (1990).
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sovereignty... [which] is the power to enforce laws against all who come
within the sovereign's territory." '35 The opposite proposition was true at
the time of Worcester, when the territorial power of tribes was largely
intact:
From the commencement of our government, congress has
passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which
treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm pur-
pose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts,
and especially that of 1802,... manifestly consider the several In-
dian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only ac-
knowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the In-
dian territory as completely separated from that of the States; and
provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively
by the government of the Union. 136
Early use of the term "self-government" was bound to territory in a
manner that symbolized powers similar to those of nations. Self-govern-
ment language originated in spatially segregated eras where the space
seemed to work as a protection against divestment and as a symbol of gov-
ernment. Thus, intact tribal governments were easily conceptualized and
maintained because of the territorial isolation of many tribes from non-tri-
bal citizens.
Indians and non-Indians lived separately at the time of the Worcester
decision, which noted that Europeans "purchased their alliance and depen-
dence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of their affairs, or
interfered with their self-government, so far as respected themselves
only."' 137 This segregation is evidenced by treaties that commonly promised
that "[no] white man ... [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said reser-
vation without [the Tribe's] permission." '138 The 1791 Treaty at Holston
stipulated that United States citizens settling on Indian land "shall forfeit
the protection of the United States, and the Cherokees may punish him or
not, as they please."' 139 Often, treaties or the Trade and Intercourse Acts
135. Id. at 685.
136. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
137. Id. at 547.
138. Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, art. II, 12 Stat. 951, 952; see also COHEN, supra
note 84, at 72-73.
139. Treaty at Holston, July 2, 1791, § 8, 7 Stat. 39, 40.
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required non-Indians traveling through Indian country to carry passports
and allowed for punishment of squatters.140
Federal policy from the beginning recognized and protected separate
status for tribal Indians in their own territory. Treaties established
distinct boundaries between tribal territory and the areas open to
white settlement, and federal laws were enacted to control white en-
try, settlement, trade, and other activities on tribal lands....
The policy of separating Indians from non-Indians reached its
peak with the removal schemes of 1816 to 1846.14 1
Eventually, seclusion gave way to integration. Self-government was di-
minished and tied to plot ownership. 42 The lack of territorial isolation that
reduced a tribe's ability to self-govern is especially due to allotment.
Under the 1887 General Allotment Act, 14 3 and subsequent allotment
acts, tribal land was divided and Indians were allotted parcels. The parcels
were held in trust by the federal government for twenty-five years or longer.
Some lands remaining after individual tribal members received allotments
were purchased by the federal government for homesteading. " By the
time the allotment era ended, more than 90,000,000 acres of Indian land
were lost. 145 Allotment was designed to dispose of tribal governments by
subjecting Indians to citizenship and state laws once the federal trust period
ended. However, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934146 halted land al-
lotment, reaffirmed tribal governments, and indefinitely extended the period
during which the federal government would hold lands in trust.
Allotment left Indian country a checkerboard of sporadic non-Indian
land holdings.147 Worcester's complete prohibition against state authority
in Indian country gave way to toleration of state law.14 8 States were
deemed to hold a legitimate interest in the affairs of non-Indian citizens in
140. See supra note 14.
141. COHEN, supra note 84, at 28 (citations omitted). "The objective was to remove the tribes
to the West beyond the boundaries of white settlement. Voluntary at first, removal became forced
under the Jackson Administration in the 1830s." Id.
142. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.
Ct. 683, 697 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
143. Indian General Allotment Act (Dawes), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
144. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 697 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
145. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
146. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
147. See County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
148. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959).
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Indian country, and this interest inevitably encroached upon tribal self-gov-
ernment. 149 However, state law could not preempt federal law,150 and Con-
gress should expressly grant to states the power over Indians.'- Thus,
minimal state jurisdiction should have been expected in the aftermath of the
Indian Reorganization Act's repudiation of allotment. In 1980, the Court
remarked, "Tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the
Federal Government, not the States." 1 52
To the benefit of self-government, cases and acts fostered the post-allot-
ment notion of geographic and jurisdictional continuity within the bounda-
ries of Indian country."' For example, in 1948 Congress redefined Indian
country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include all land within the boundaries of an
existing reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent.154 By this
act, "Congress uncouple[d] reservation status from Indian ownership, and
statutorily define[d] Indian country to include lands held in fee by non-
Indians within reservation boundaries." ' 5
149. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-79 (1973). Williams noted that
"the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indi-
ans to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams, 358 U.S. at 220; see Fisher v.
District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
150. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983); Central Mach. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
151. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220-21; see also Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 207;
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 759, 765 (1985).
152. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
154 (1980); see also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686-87
(1965) ("[F]rom the very first days of our Government, the Federal Government had been permit-
ting the Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state interference.").
153. In United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1909), the Court noted that the
Treaty at Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927, provided for allotment, and that the defendant
was a citizen. Id. at 289. The Court still held that the murder of one Indian citizen by another on
patented land was covered by the Major Crimes Act instead of state law. Once Congress has
"established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until sepa-
rated therefrom by Congress." Id at 285. After the allotment era, Celestine was cited for this
same proposition. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984); Seymour v. Superintendent of
Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).
154. Although allotment acts specific to certain tribes diminished the outer boundaries of
some reservations, causing ceded land to lose its Indian country status, nonceded land within the
diminished borders retained Indian country status. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584
(1977). Trust land located outside of a reservation with diminished boundaries is also Indian
country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). Opening reservations for homesteading did not always
diminish the boundaries of the reservation. Many tribal allotments simply permitted non-Indians
to settle within the existing reservation, which remained all Indian country. Solem, 465 U.S. at
470; Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356.
155. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468.
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In the same context, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 156
noted that the General Allotment Act had not been expressly repealed but
found checkerboard jurisdiction to be inconsistent with the intent embodied
in the Indian Reorganization Act's repudiation of allotment. 157 The Court
rejected checkerboard jurisdiction, stating that if "the existence or nonexis-
tence of an Indian reservation, and therefore existence or nonexistence of
federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of
land,"' 58 then law enforcement officials would have to "search tract books"
in order to determine where jurisdiction extended. 159
In opposition to indications of the elimination of checkerboard allot-
ment policy, and in opposition to the general bar on state authority over
tribes, a mix of Oliphant's non-Indian propositions and geographic territory
combined to produce a territorially disruptive tribal zoning scheme in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation."6
Brendale held that the Yakima Nation lacked the authority to implement a
continuous zoning plan on its reservation, which was composed of twenty
percent Indian and non-Indian fee land, and eighty percent Indian land
held in trust."' Brendale found, inter alia, that the tribe could not com-
pletely zone the checkerboard area, despite the Yakima treaty provision
guaranteeing the "exclusive use and benefit" of reservation land to the tribe,
because the Indian Reorganization Act did not restore exclusive use of the
reservation to the tribe.1 62 Using Oliphant's suggestion that historical
records be evaluated in terms of the events of the era, Brendale utilized
repudiated allotment era policy and concluded that the congressional intent
of allotment would not expose some non-Indian fee land to tribal zoning
authority. 63
Brendale also questioned whether inherent sovereignty permitted the
tribe's actions. Citing Montana, Oliphant, and Wheeler, the Court con-
cluded that inherent sovereignty did not support the zoning of non-Indian
fee land. Inherent sovereignty was determined by what the Court viewed as
necessary to protect internal self-government. Tribes were divested of any
156. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
157. Id. at 477-79. Eventually, Moe would be revisited outside the context of tribal post-
allotment, geographic continuity. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
158. Moe, 425 U.S. at 478 (quoting Seymour, 368 U.S. at 358).
159. Id. (quoting Seymour, 368 U.S. at 358).
160. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 415 (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 423 (plurality opinion).
163. Id. at 421-25 (plurality opinion).
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power inconsistent with their dependent status, "that is, to the extent it
involve[d] a tribe's 'external relations.'""
Consequently, Brendale can permit some county zoning in Indian areas
even though Indian regions can cross county, state, and national borders. 165
Further, Brendale's dependency analysis of tribes' power over non-Indians
led to the assertion that express matters need not always be consulted:
"Given our disposition of these cases, we need not address whether the
Yakima Nation's retained sovereignty might also have been divested by
treaty or statute."'
166
Brendale's reactivation of allotment hinders territorially cohesive exer-
cises of tribal self-government. The apparent postallotment understanding
of Indian country's geographic continuity can be interpreted as illusory for
tribes for several indirect reasons. First, shortly before allotment, statehood
altered the federal jurisdictional scheme in Indian country by transferring
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the federal government to the
states.1 67 Then, in 1978, Oliphant allowed exclusive state criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians. Finally, in 1981, Montana's use of Oliphant altered
tribal civil authority, thereby establishing non-Indians and their land plots
as a force nearly independent of the states. 168 The presumptive loss of tribal
power over non-Indians and their land 169 has meant that important aspects
of tribal self-government could be placed exclusively in the hands of the
state, not by any affirmative state empowerment, but by default. 70
164. Id. at 426 (plurality opinion).
165. For example, only two-thirds of the Navajo reservation lies within Arizona. The St.
Regis Mohawk land crosses an international boundary, with reservation land designated on both
sides by Canada and the United States.
166. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 426 n.9 (plurality opinion).
167. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Recently, North Dakota re-evaluated
its original constitution and enabling act and overturned 35-year-old case law. The state deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes committed by Indians on the reservation
and could therefore ignore the tribe's extradition agreement with the state. State v. Hook, 476
N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1991).
168. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S.
Ct. 683 (1992), summarized that states had criminal "and implicitly, civil" jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Id. at 688. According to Montana, regulating non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee land
was inconsistent with tribes' dependent status and "bears no clear relationship to tribal self-gov-
ernment or internal relations." Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). By not per-
mitting the tribe to regulate fishing or hunting, Montana found a plot-based, checkerboard, tribal
self-government description similar to Brendale.
169. See, eg., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
170. For example, Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991), held that the
district court erred in dismissing a case, brought by a non-Indian corporation against a non-Indian
tribal attorney, for failing to exhaust tribal court remedies. The non-Indian status of both parties
was relevant to the determination that the federal court rather than the tribal court should hear
the case. Id. at 661, 663. Judge Fernandez dissented and remarked: "What we are doing here is
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"[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States,"' 17 1 yet, withdrawal of tribal jurisdiction may
implement state regulatory authority, even though neither the General Al-
lotment Act 172 nor Public Law 280 federally grants states regulatory au-
thority. 173  Thus, unless tribal integrity is imperiled or relations are
contractual, 174 state regulation of non-Indian property can preclude tribes'
continuous land regulatory schemes to the obvious detriment of tribal self-
government. Accordingly, the very territory that protected tribal govern-
ments when they were isolated, dismantled tribal powers well after allot-
ment, despite the Indian Reorganization Act and an amended definition of
Indian country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima In-
dian Nation 175 confirmed the Court's recent trend of narrowly construing
the Indian Reorganization Act's repudiation of allotment. In County of
Yakima, the state successfully taxed Indian fee land under provisions of the
General Allotment Act and its Burke Act Amendment. The Court rea-
soned that the Indian Reorganization Act halted allotment, but "Congress
made no attempt to undo the dramatic effects of the allotment years on the
ownership of former Indian lands."' 176 Allotment was not rendered a 'dead
letter' through an implied repeal by the Indian Reorganization Act. 17 7 "[I]t
is a 'cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored,'" and
Moe made no mention of an implied repeal of the Allotment Act.'78 Be-
cause County of Yakima is a tax case, tribes' continuous regulatory author-
ity over land is not affected in the same sense as Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,179 where zoning should be
allowing Stock West to drag its dispute with the tribe through the back door of the federal court-
house. The parties know that, the tribe knows it, the district judge knows it, we know it. So does
the law." Id. at 668 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
171. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
154 (1980).
172. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 436
(1989) (plurality opinion) ("The Dawes Act did not itself transfer any regulatory power from the
Tribe to any state or local governmental authority.").
173. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (As opposed to
criminal prohibition, state regulatory authority refers to laws that apply to conduct generally
permissible in a state; Public Law 280 does not grant states civil regulatory authority in Indian
country); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
174. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
175. 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
176. Id. at 686.
177. Id. at 688-89.
178. Id. at 690.
179. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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regionally continuous, and Montana v. United States, 8 where hunting laws
should be regionally continuous. Nevertheless, County of Yakima is in-
structive for reasons beyond its bolstering of allotment.
First, County of Yakima makes clear that state power would not be im-
plicitly divested. 8 and that only tribal power faced such divestment. Sec-
ond, the territorial suggestions of County of Yakima and Brendale inhibit
use of the tribal power of exclusion for the maintenance of self-government.
For instance, Duro suggested that one way to resolve law enforcement
problems in Indian country would be through the exclusion of individuals
from tribal lands.'" 2 However, Brendale found that the tribes no longer had
the power to exclude non-Indians from their lands.'83 Thus, the reality of
excluding perpetrators from tribal lands in lieu of actual criminal jurisdic-
tion is a limited, if not a useless, solution given the checkerboard nature of
Indian country, which includes not only tribal land, but also Indian and
non-Indian fee land.
Finally, County of Yakima revisited Moe v. Confederated Salish & Koo-
tenai Tribes'84 in the postallotment, procheckerboard context and inter-
preted Moe to condemn a checkerboard pattern "in which an Indian's
personal law would depend upon his parcel ownership."' 85 Yet, the power
of tribes to exclude non-Indians, as discussed in Brendale, can depend on
non-Indian parcel ownership because Brendale limited the ability of tribes
to exclude non-Indians from their fee land.'86 Thus, the Brendale situation
governing non-Indian exclusions is forbidden by County of Yakima, which
condemned personal law fluctuations caused by plot ownership.'87
In summary, some contemporary attempts to define self-government
emanate from Oliphant's initial divestment of tribal authority over non-In-
dians. The self-government definitions apply territorially disruptive crimi-
nal and civil jurisdiction schemes. The Indian Reorganization Act rejected
allotment and reaffirmed tribal governments. Accordingly, self-government
should not be defined in terms of allotment, which fosters state self-govern-
ance more than tribal self-governance.
180. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
181. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 696 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
182. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-97 (1990).
183. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423 (plurality opinion).
184. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
185. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690.
186. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422-23 (plurality opinion).
187. County of Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690-91.
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Other recent definitions of self-government are discussed in the next two
sections. These definitions concern the designations of governable citizens
within the territory, including Oliphant's government participation concept
and Duro's membership concept.
B. Government Participation and Membership
1. Government Participation
Non-Indian participation in the federal government predated Indian
participation and allowed non-Indians to acquire Indian land. Nonmem-
bers currently participate in state and federal governments, yet cases popu-
larly allude to nonmember disenfranchisement. For example, Brendale
raised government participation issues by noting that land in the Yakima
reservation was partially owned by non-Indians who represented a large
part of the population yet lacked participation in tribal governance. 88
Oliphant set the groundwork for the participation questions raised in
Duro by excluding non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction. Specifi-
cally, non-Indians could not vote, hold office, or sit on a tribal jury; hence,
the application of criminal jurisdiction was inappropriate. Duro used this
argument to assert that nonmember Indians had a synonymous relationship
with tribes and, as a result, should be accorded the same treatment as non-
Indians. 89 Duro's assertion requires the assumption that the appropriate
class of persons to be governed by tribal criminal law should be defined by
participation in government.
Although the justification for federal Indian legislation lies in the status
of an Indian tribe as a sovereign political entity, 190 government participa-
tion does not serve as an appropriate indicator of tribal criminal jurisdiction
for several reasons. First, in identical federal or state situations, no political
affiliation is necessary for those governments to assert criminal jurisdiction
over aliens. Instead, the status of the prosecutor as a governing body within
a territory renders the power to adjudicate criminal offenses.' 9  Moreover,
188. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415.
189. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Generalization of the Court's Oliphant and
Duro decisions to tribes beyond those in the cases does so at the cost of ignoring the practices of
many tribes. For instance, for many years the Chief Judge at the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Court was a non-Indian who "participated" in tribal government in that sense.
190. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974). Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), held that exclusive tribal court jurisdic-
tion over adoptions was permissible. The Court reasoned that even if an Indian plaintiff were
denied a forum that a non-Indian could access, the treatment is derived from the quasi-sovereign
status of tribes and is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of Indians by furthering
the policy of Indian self-governance. Id. at 390.
191. Cf Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Merrion stated:
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if political participation were required to govern criminal matters, the fed-
eral government should not have imposed the 1885 Major Crimes Act or
other federal laws on Indians who did not all become citizens until 1924.
Additionally, lack of government participation does not prevent tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians in some civil matters. 192
If government participation were simply the only nonracial link between
nonmember Indians and non-Indians, the elimination of Duro by legislation
would mean that the current nonmember Indian inclusion and the non-
Indian exclusion from tribal jurisdiction are impermissibly based on race.
Inverse challenges that federal laws over tribes constitute racial discrimina-
tion have failed. 193 With Oliphant still in force over tribal law, the recent
reinstatement of tribes' inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians could
be viewed to reflect Oliphant's ambiguous historical considerations or tri-
bal/non-tribal citizen designations rather than racial designations. At any
rate, now that nonmember Indians are included in tribal jurisdiction, gov-
ernment participation can only weakly justify the non-Indian exclusion.
Curiously, when Duro made its citizen distinction as one of member
Indians, nonmember Indians, and non-Indians, Duro altered Montana by
re-extending tribal authority over nonmember and non-Indian land. Mon-
tana had made authority over nonmember or non-Indian land contingent
Whatever place consent may have in contractual matters and in the creation of democratic
governments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an exercise of legitimate
sovereign authority. Requiring the consent of an entrant deposits in the hands of the ex-
cludable non-Indian the source of the tribe's power, when the power instead derives from
sovereignty itself. Only the Federal Government may limit a tribe's exercise of its sover-
eign authority. Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember; to the
contrary, the nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the
limitations the tribe may choose to impose.
Id. at 147 (footnote omitted).
192. E.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 688; National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845 (1985).
193. In Antelope, the exercise of federal jurisdiction over Indians accused of offenses enumer-
ated in the Major Crimes Act constituted a valid exercise of federal law despite the use of state
laws in cases involving non-Indians charged with committing the same crime in the same place.
Federal Indian tribe legislation is not derived from impermissible racial classifications, but rather
from the quasi-sovereign status of tribes. That the particular state law covering non-Indians may
prove more lenient in some cases has no bearing:
Under our federal system, the National Government does not violate equal protection
when its own body of law is evenhanded, regardless of the laws of the States with respect to
the same subject matter. The Federal Government treated respondents in the same man-
ner as all other persons within federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory scheme that
did not erect impermissible racial classifications.
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 649-50 (footnotes omitted); see also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976) (If treatment can be tied rationally to fulfillment of Congress's
unique obligation toward Indians, such legislation can be imposed.).
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on (1) a necessity to preserve tribal integrity or (2) a contractual relation-
ship.'94 Duro added that civil authority over nonmembers and non-Indians
"typically involves situations arising from property ownership within the
reservation." 195
Thus, once Duro fully established its vision of citizen divisions, it rein-
stated a presumption of tribal civil land-plot control. This control is espe-
cially important in cases like zoning, where regions must be continuously
controlled. To keep such tribal authority, the new Duro legislation could be
read to both reaffirm tribes' inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
and to amend the Court's citizen reference point to two groups-tribal and
non-tribal citizens.
2. Membership
Oliphant's idea that tribes limit jurisdiction to participants in tribal gov-
ernment extended naturally to Duro's concept of membership. Even if lack
of government participation provided a reason for excluding nonmember
Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction, reducing tribal jurisdiction to
membership is inappropriate for implied divestment at incorporation be-
cause tribes, not the federal government, have historically governed rela-
tions with other tribes.196 The Indian-against-Indian exception to federal
jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 1152 does not distinguish between tribes, indicat-
ing little federal concern about the tribe to which an accused criminal be-
longed under tribal law. In fact, before tribes began collecting information
for membership rolls under the Indian Reorganization Act, federal mem-
bership records kept for federally imposed matters such as allotment were
sometimes inaccurate.' 97 However, the federal government acknowledged
the presence of nonmember Indians on reservations. For instance, federal
CFR courts have jurisdiction over member and nonmember Indians, and
federal Major Crimes Act jurisdiction applies to Indians in Indian country
irrespective of whether the perpetrator committed the crime on his home
194. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
195. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
196. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
197. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). The Court remarked that the federal gov-
ernment failed to fulfill its obligations to the tribe because of "incompetence, if not corruption" in
the removal and recordation process, which "proved an embarrassment and an intractable prob-
lem for the Federal Government for at least a century." Id. at 643; see also DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 437 n. 16 (1975) (indicating that accurate enrollment for the purpose
of allotment was nearly impossible); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1938) (Woman was
not enrolled in her tribe because she was too young and her mother was away.); Winton v. Amos,
255 U.S. 373 (1921) (chronicling federal attempts to record and define members of the Choctaw
Nation).
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reservation. 198 Duro's concern that nonmembers would be tried by alien
courts is at least belated given the federal practice of placing different tribes
into the same reservations during the removal era199 while other tribes were
divided up and placed on separate reservations.2"
If Duro had been applied, it is unclear which membership definition
would have been used. Different federal acts define the term "Indian" dif-
ferently. Thus, a person may be a member for some federal purposes but
not others.20 ' Furthermore, the federal criminal statutes do not define "In-
dian" for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Consequently, federal confusion
exists over Indian status and tribal affiliation.202 This is apparent in federal
cases where the tribe was admitted into the United States relatively
late,20 3 where persons are classified as members by adoption rather than race,2°4
198. Duro, 495 U.S. at 689-90. Distinctions between members and nonmembers are not al-
ways drawn. In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court
held that Indians in Indian country were exempt from certain state taxes. The exemption applied
"irrespective of their actual membership." Id. at 480-81 n.16.
199. Elizabeth A. Harvey, The Aftermath of Duro v. Reina: A Congressional Attempt to Re-
affirm Tribal Sovereignty Through Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 8 COOLEY L.
REV. 573, 588 (1991).
200. Id
201. COHEN, supra note 84, at 26.
202. Under federal law, lack of enrollment in an Indian tribe is not determinative of Indian
status. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938).
203. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). In Sandoval, the Court decided that
federal Indian laws applied to the Pueblos because the people residing there could be labeled
Indians. Deciding their status was necessary so federal laws would not be applied arbitrarily:
"The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and
disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs and domestic
government . . . and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their
ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior people." Id. at 39. For a brief
history on the former label of Alaska Native groups as patriarchal rather than tribal, see Native
Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
patriarchal label "deprive[d] Alaska natives of the same right to sovereignty over their political
affairs that Indians in the rest of the United States had.")
204. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897), held that the federal courts had no
jurisdiction when the defendants were native and the victim was a white man who was adopted by
the Cherokee Nation through marriage in accord with the laws of the Cherokee Nation. Since the
victim was a Cherokee Nation citizen by adoption, and the defendants were natives by blood,
federal law and the Cherokee treaty stipulated that tribal, rather than federal, jurisdiction applied.
But see United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846):
Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee
by adoption, his responsibility to the laws of the United States remained unchanged and
undiminished. He was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not within the
[Indian against Indian] exception in the act of [C]ongress.
Id. at 573; see Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) (Cherokee treaty agreeing to abolish
slavery in 1866 gave some freedmen the rights of Cherokees but did not make all freedmen Indi-
ans for purposes of federal jurisdiction.).
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and where persons are classified as Native Americans by their race but not
by federal law.2 °5
The use of tribal definitions of membership would eliminate uncertainty
in federal criminal statutes and would allow tribes to continue determining
membership for their own tribal law purposes. However, Duro implied that
tribal membership criteria could not be determined freely. Specifically,
Duro stated that it might be possible for neighboring tribal governments to
enter into reciprocal agreements giving each jurisdiction over the other's
members,20 6 or to make tribal agreements not to exclude someone who
agrees to submit to jurisdiction.20 7 The reference to agreements seems to
restrict Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,2 °8 which acknowledged the ability
of tribes to designate membership criteria. If tribes could freely designate
membership criteria, they could declare all residents or Indians to be tribal
members, permanent residents, or aliens without agreements. 20 9 Because
that proposition is the same as holding inherent jurisdiction,210 Duro
seemed to indicate that tribal membership definitions would be determined
by some nontribal criteria. As a result, it remains unclear how tribes would
have determined the scope of tribal jurisdiction under Duro.
Government participation, membership, or citizenship is generally rele-
vant only to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and thus should not be
significant in determining tribes' territorial criminal jurisdiction.211 Confin-
ing a tribe's self-government to only some plots of land within the territory
or to only some people committing crimes within the territory is adminis-
tratively difficult, and it defines tribal power in ways that limit, if not anni-
hilate, the prospects for systematic tribal governments.
205. United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1974). The federal government ended its
recognition of the political status of the Klammath Tribe under the Klammath Termination Act;
therefore, the Major Crimes Act did not apply to crimes committed by members of a terminated
tribe. State law applied. Id. at 18-19; see also Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896)
(holding that illegitimate child of Choctaw man and slave woman not federally regarded as an
Indian).
206. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) ("Our decision here also does not address the
ability of neighboring tribal governments that share law enforcement concerns to enter into recip-
rocal agreements giving each jurisdiction over the other's members.").
207. Id. at 689.
208. Cf 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
209. Id.
210. For an alternative view of Duro's membership effects, see Eric B. White, Note, Falling
Through the Cracks After Duro v. Reina: A Close Look at a Jurisdictional Failure, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 229, 255 (1991).
211. See supra note 112.
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VI. INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP
The most extraordinary proposition shared by Oliphant and Duro con-
cerned the protection of citizens from tribal court intrusions into their per-
sonal liberty. Tying together theories of government participation, implied
divestment, and citizenship, both cases concluded that criminal jurisdiction
was such an intrusion on personal liberty that tribes necessarily lost juris-
diction when they surrendered to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States. As a result, Oliphant and Duro concluded that non-Indians and
nonmembers could not be tried by tribes that did not provide Bill of Rights
protections. According to Duro, the criminal jurisdiction retained by tribes
was limited to those people who consented to be members and thus con-
sented to the lesser protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
The "protection of citizens" concept in Duro was based on Reid v. Cov-
ert,212 which held that a United States citizen, the wife of a military man,
could not be tried overseas by a military court since those courts did not
provide the full protections of the Bill of Rights. The superficial relation-
ship between Reid and Duro includes the partial availability of Bill of
Rights protections and consent to be in the military or to be a tribal mem-
ber. The crucial difference lies in the nature of tribal courts and military
tribunals. Unlike military courts, tribes do not derive their power strictly
from the federal government. 213 Talton v. Mayes 214 explained that powers
executed by tribes existed prior to the Constitution were not federal powers
arising from the Constitution.21 5
Moreover, "[i]f tribes were implicitly divested of their power to enforce
criminal laws over nonmember Indians once those Indians became citizens,
the tribes were also implicitly divested of their power to enforce criminal
laws over their own members who are now citizens as well."' 216 Aside from
the impact of any unwritten law, Duro's reasoning also does not explain the
importance of Indians' loss of rights before alien Indian tribunals because
Indians face the same losses when before courts of their own tribes.21 7
212. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
213. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1978).
214. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
215. Id. at 384.
216. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Concerns about alien courts are not new. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), held
that Indians could not be subjected to alien federal courts because these courts tried Indians "not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by ... a different
race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception." Id. at
571. Congress effectively limited Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act shortly after the
decision. Ironically, Oliphant used the argument to support the opposite proposition that non-
Indians needed protection from alien Indian courts.
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Duro's theory that an individual's consent to be a tribal member vali-
dates differences between the Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act
is weak in light of the history of federal enactments. Because the Indian
Reorganization Act reaffirmed tribal governments and was passed to stop
the destruction caused by allotment and because the Indian Civil Rights
Act was in part passed to reflect the limited budgets of tribes, the failure of
the acts to provide full constitutional protection under the rationale of
Oliphant and Duro would have to be labeled, at best, as Congress's uncon-
scionable compromise; at worst, the Indian Civil Rights Act is
unconstitutional.2 18
Congress's affirmation of "inherent" sovereign power over nonmember
Indians reaffirmed that the Indian Civil Rights Act was not to be used
against tribal governments, but rather as an instrument to protect any per-
son before a tribal court. An obvious explanation for the distinctions be-
tween the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Bill of Rights is that tribes are
still acknowledged as somewhat distinct from the federal government and
the federal constitution. Additionally, the distinctions can be explained as
nonfundamental, 219 or as selective incorporation. 220 The differences be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act include the lack of
free counsel for criminal defendants and the lack of a jury for civil trials. 22'
Though the concept of fundamental rights is cloudy, it is clear that Oli-
phant and Duro brought attention to what the cases characterized as a
problem of reconciling the Indian Civil Rights Act with citizenship. The
attention appears to be undue because just as the Bill of Rights applies to
both Indians and non-Indians before a federal court, the Indian Civil Rights
Act applies to both Indians and non-Indians before a tribal court.222 In
other words, the Indian Civil Rights Act prohibits a tribal government from
denying to any "person" within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.223 Tribal citizens simply hold dual citizenship. Federal citizenship
over Indians did not destroy tribal citizenship,224 thereby making tribal
members citizens and subjects of both governments.
218. For a discussion of consent, see supra note 191.
219. Cf Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
220. See Nell J. Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 109 (1992).
221. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 5 (1991).
222. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
223. See id.
224. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653-54 (1978) (A portion of the Choctaw




Dual citizenship has meant that individual Indians experienced an unu-
sual form of federal citizenship. In United States v. Celestine,22 5 the Court
held that citizenship did not preclude federal jurisdiction over tribes: "[I]t
cannot be said to be clear that Congress intended, by the mere grant of
citizenship, to renounce entirely its jurisdiction over the individual mem-
bers of this dependent race."' 226 Non-Indians do not hold dual citizenship,
and in this sense, they are aliens before a tribe. However, aliens are pro-
tected before tribal courts.2 2 7
The federal government imposed the Indian Civil Rights Act on tribes
to ensure individual rights against tribal governments. The Act not only
was designed to protect individuals from tribal governments, but also to
serve the goal of protecting tribes from undue influence from states. To
protect tribes from state interference, the Act eliminated a state's ability to
assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian country without prior con-
sent of tribes.22 8
In another effort to block federal or state interference, the federal gov-
ernment deliberately excluded federal review provisions for civil rights vio-
lations, other than habeas corpus, because tribal forums were best equipped
to determine which remedies were beneficial for tribal survival.229 Congress
had originally suggested extending all constitutional guarantees to tribal
governments but then decided to modify the Bill of Rights to fit the "unique
political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments. '230
225. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
226. Id. at 290-91. "The act of May 8, 1906 [34 Stat. at L. 182, chap. 2348], extending to the
expiration of the trust period the time when the allottees of the act of 1887 shall be subject to state
laws, is worthy of note as suggesting that Congress, in granting full rights of citizenship to Indi-
ans, believed that it had been hasty." Id. at 291.
227. Despite the protection granted by the Indian Civil Rights Act, non-Indians consistently
seek exclusions from tribal authority. For example, in Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030
(Ariz. 1991), non-Indians tried to apply Oliphant to avoid appearing as witnesses in a criminal
case held before the Navajo tribal court.
228. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63-64 (1978) (discussing the Act of Aug.
15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, § 7, 67 Stat. 590, which permitted a few states to assume civil and criminal
jurisdiction over reservations without tribal consent).
229. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 61-72. Congressional history and the refusal to provide
other remedies indicate that Congress wished to avoid "the intrusive effect of federal judicial
review upon tribal self-government." Id. at 70. Only "minimal" monitoring is provided by the
Departments of Justice Interior. When the Indian Reorganization Act was passed, Secretarial
approval of tribal constitutions was required, but, as of 1988, the approval provision was dimin-
ished to include only about half of the tribal courts. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
221, at 14-22.
230. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62-63.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Notwithstanding the effort to fit "unique" needs2 3 1 and to protect tribes
from the "undue influence" of state or federal authority, the Civil Rights
Act's influence was to assimilate tribal courts. 2 3 2 Even though a tribe's sov-
ereign powers predate federal powers and do not emanate from federal law,
and even though the organization of the Iroquois Confederation influenced
the Articles of Confederation, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
curiously concluded that a civil rights statute was necessary because tribal
judges lacked experience, training, and familiarity with "the traditions and
forms of the American legal system. "233
VII. CONCLUSION
The peculiar remnants of past federal policy left tribes with a patchwork
of conflicting laws that has served as an impediment to self-government.
Allotment left tribes with a checkerboard of Indian country. Courts recom-
mend excluding offenders from tribal land, failing to realize that implemen-
tation of the remedy in checkerboard Indian country has little enforcement
effectiveness over non-Indian landowners. The tribal roll system gave mem-
bership, for federal purposes, a life of its own with a federally imposed sig-
nificance that greatly influences tribes' self-defined uses of membership.
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Indian Reorganization Act, the
tribal courts are forced to resemble non-Indian courts, turning the current
era of self-governance backward into the era of assimilation.234
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe235 formulates a particularly potent
solution to Indian country problems that suggests suffocation of tribal
courts. Both Duro and Oliphant called on Congress to resolve the inconsis-
tencies in federal law by forcing tribal law to change in accordance with
231. Tribal court budgets are "uniquely" limited. The Civil Rights Commission found that
funding was a major problem with tribal justice systems. One "recent tribal court budget was
$300,000, while the budget for a similar state circuit court budget with similar responsibilities was
over $1 million." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 221, at 38.
232. Commissioner William B. Allen, writing separately from the Civil Rights Commission,
found that citizens could not be placed outside the Constitution and that the "United States has
no power whatever to make exception, for any purpose whatever." Id. at 76-79. Before people in
tribes were citizens, actions of the federal government were also constitutionally impermissible.
Allen thought that a resolution of the constitutional ambiguities facing individuals might embrace
"the choice of full sovereignty or citizenship." Id.
233. 113 CONG. REC. H13473 (daily ed. May 23, 1967) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (emphasis
added).
234. Duro and Oliphant come close to comparing federal administrative, military, or legisla-
tive courts to tribal courts, despite the nondelegated origin of tribal power and the present and
historic distance between the tribes and the U.S. Constitution.
235. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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delegations of power from the federal government.236 When Congress did
speak, it did not delegate power to tribes or expressly divest tribal power.
Instead, Congress reaffirmed the "inherent power of Indian tribes" to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
The historical arguments offered in Oliphant are ambiguous. Congress
never expressly forbade tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.237
Given the historic isolation of tribes, the constant policy switches of the
federal government, and the Indian Reorganization Act, there was no rea-
son to believe that the government would forever presume that tribes were
divested of concurrent jurisdiction upon incorporation into the United
States.238
Oliphant "proved too much" by saying that non-Indians as federal citi-
zens could not be subjected to a non-Bill-of-Rights court; even tribal mem-
bers, as federal citizens, were encompassed by its reasoning. The
nonmember Indian result in Duro v. Reina 2 39 directly followed and was in a
sense directly included in Oliphant. As a result, the demise of Duro seems
to have pinned the validity of Oliphant on its criticized historical argu-
ments. In 1981 and 1991, the Commission on Civil Rights recommended a
bright-line rule whereby tribes would assume jurisdiction over all per-
sons.2' Whether or not Oliphant's restriction on tribes' criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians remains, implicit divestment of tribal authority
should end. Further, employment of the implicit divestment rationale
would reduce tribes to the task of having to imagine whether their actions
could or should conceivably be divested. The overbroad and unwieldy rea-
soning of Oliphant surfaced in later cases and produced unpredictable re-
sults. For instance, few could have imagined that the Yakima Nation's
zoning scheme would be destroyed by the plan in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation,24 which seemed to advocate spot
zoning.
Abstractions, beginning with the discovery doctrine and ending with the
implicit divestment doctrine, serve to cover intolerant assumptions. The
constant references to informal Indian court systems in Duro and in Oli-
phant and the historic waffling of federal officials over whether tribes pos-
sessed full or lawless governments confuses validity with tolerance. More
important, it clouds the inequitable reality that the federal government pun-
236. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686, 698 (1990); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-12.
237. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
238. Cf. The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
239. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
240. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 221, at 70 n.186.
241. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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ishes tribes for federally created problems. For example, Duro criticized the
lack of separation of powers in many tribal governments when the system
was recommended to tribes by means of the Bureau of Indian Affairs model
constitution. 242
The Indian Civil Rights Act, according to the sponsor, "should not be
considered as the final solution to the many serious constitutional problems
confronting the American Indian. ''2 43 We should consider how the
problems were created. And, the federal government should consider
whether its own system regarding tribes is influenced by "unique customs."
Along the same lines, the language of the courts in this area dehuman-
izes people. When the Court announces its concern for unwarranted intru-
sions into "their" personal liberty, the question really should be, who is the
Court referring to? The question seems to have been answered by United
States v. Wheeler: [Tribes] have a significant interest in maintaining orderly
relations among their members and in preserving tribal customs and tradi-
tions, apart from the federal interest in law and order on the reservation.
Tribal laws and procedures are often influenced by tribal custom and can
differ greatly from our own.2' To whom does "our" refer, and why the
implication that tribes have little interest in law and order?
242. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 221, at 36.
243. 113 CONG. REC. H13473 (daily ed. May 23, 1967) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
244. 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1978) (emphasis added).
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